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Abstract
7
This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In
equilibrium, agents’ effort choices are inﬂuenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is 9
the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he
expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents 11
with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences; (2) under
a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater probability; (3) while, under 13
the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity
rule; and (4) when agents are identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal. 15
© 2006 Published by Elsevier Inc.
JEL classiﬁcation: C70; D72 17
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1. Introduction 19
Many economic and political settings involve multilateral bargaining in which a group of
agents negotiate over the allocation of some surplus. Such settings range from two nations’ ne- 21
gotiating over a disputed territory, to legislators’ deciding on the distribution of funds across
states, parties’ negotiating over the formation of a government in a multiparty parliamentary 23
system, various divisions of an organization negotiating over scarce resources, and existing
members of an international club, e.g., NAFTA, EU or WTO, negotiating the terms of 25
accession for a candidate country. While in some cases agreement requires the unanimous
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approval of all interested parties, in others, the approval by a subset of agents is sufﬁcient 1
to implement a speciﬁc allocation. For instance, whereas a unanimous approval is needed for
the enlargement programs of most international clubs or an organization’s budget plan, the ap- 3
proval by a simple majority is sufﬁcient to reach a legislative decision or to form a coalitional
government. 5
Building on Rubinstein’s [33] pioneering work, an elegant theoretical literature has emerged
on multilateral (sequential) bargaining generating testable predictions about the equilibrium 7
outcomes in a wide variety of environments. A key prediction of this literature is the pres-
ence of the “proposal power” in that the agent who proposes how to allocate the surplus re- 9
ceives a disproportionate share. 1Thus, understanding how the proposal power is gained and
distributed among negotiating parties is crucial in understanding the allocation of surplus, and 11
the parties’ payoffs. With some exceptions discussed below, the extant literature assumes an
exogenous “recognition process” that selects the proposer according to certain rigid institu- 13
tional and organizational procedures. For instance, whereas the alternating offer models a la
Rubinstein [33] allow agents to take turns making proposals, a subsequent generalization in- 15
troduced by Binmore [5] endows agents with a ﬁxed probability of recognition. Absent such
rigid procedures, however, agents might take costly measures to tip the proposal power in their 17
favor. Examples abound. In organizations such as a university, a public agency, or a corpo-
ration, the allocation of scarce resources is often the outcome of active negotiations between 19
different units, rather than external rules, and the share each unit receives is mostly determined
by its power gained through costly activities. (See, e.g., [14,18,30].) At international negoti- 21
ations such as the ones between Pakistan and India, and those between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots over disputed territories, involved nations have often lobbied other nations to gain 23
support for their proposals. Finally, in mediated bargaining, negotiating parties need to con-
vince and educate the mediator about their demands, which frequently require hiring experts 25
and professionals who can process information and present the case more effectively on their
behalf. 2 27
Theobjectiveofthispaperistoendogenizetherecognitionprocessbylettingagentscompeteto
be the proposer.Aside from generating proposal power as an equilibrium outcome, this will also 29
allow us to link the incentives to propose to agents’characteristics such as their time preferences
and cost efﬁciency as well as to the institutional and organizational variables such as the voting 31
ruleandthenumberofagents.Severalinterestingissuesarisefromtheanalysis.Regardingagents’
characteristics,domorepatientagentshavealesserincentivetopropose?Doescompetitionforthe 33
proposal power become more intense in a more homogenous group? Can the cost of recognition
ever outweigh the beneﬁts of proposal power in equilibrium? Regarding the institutional and 35
organizationalvariables,whatistheroleofvotingrulesonthecompetitionforandthedistribution
of proposal power? 37
The formal model builds on the Baron and Ferejohn [1–3] framework, where a group of agents
wants to divide a ﬁxed surplus among themselves. Instead of assigning a ﬁxed probability of 39
recognition,however,Iassume,asintherent-seekingliterature,thatagentsexpend(unproductive)
1 There is growing empirical evidence that conﬁrms this prediction. For instance, Knight [19] uncovers that represen-
tatives afﬁliated with the Congressional transportation committee have used their proposal power to secure more project
spending for their districts than other representatives.
2 It is important that the recognition of an agent to propose be interpreted in a broader sense to include cases in which
the agent does not literally propose but the proposal put forward, say by a mediator, is closest to his.
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efforts to be recognized and win the rents associated with the proposal power. 3 , 4 In particular, 1
before each round of bargaining, agents simultaneously choose their effort levels, which stochas-
tically determine the proposer. The greater one’s effort is, the more likely he is to propose. As is 3
common in the literature on sequential bargaining, I assume agents adopt stationary strategies,
and use the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) as the solution concept throughout. 5
A brief preview of my main ﬁndings is as follows. Consistent with Baron and Ferejohn [1–3]
and most bargaining models with complete information, there are no delays in equilibrium, since 7
the proposer secures the consent of a minimal “winning coalition” by including in the allocation
those agents with the “cheapest” votes. Unlike these models, however, inefﬁciencies do arise in 9
equilibrium owing to unproductive efforts that agents expend to be recognized. The extent of
these inefﬁciencies depends on the (net) prize each agent hopes to earn by being the proposer 11
and his marginal cost of effort. The prize, which is endogenous to the bargaining process, is the
difference between the residual surplus an agent claims when he is the proposer and the payment 13
he expects to receive when he is not. It is well-known in the literature that under the unanimity
rule, all agents receive the same prize irrespective of their time preferences, 5 and thus I ﬁnd that 15
two agents with equal marginal costs exert the same effort, and propose with equal probabilities
in equilibrium. The prize from proposing does, however, vary across players, when agreement 17
requires less than unanimous approval. In particular, players with more expensive votes expect
to earn a greater prize, because such players are less likely to be included in winning coalitions. 19
I show that, all else equal, more patient players possess more expensive votes and consequently
exert a greater effort to propose. Despite gaining the proposal power, however, they can end up 21
being worse off than less patient ones, which is in sharp contrast to the case with the unanimity
rule under which patient agents are always better off in equilibrium. 23
Next, I investigate the extent of the social cost generated by the resources wasted during the





every agent’s afﬁrmative vote is needed, this implies that the heterogeneity reduces the prize from
proposing, and hence the incentives to propose. In a sense, the presence of “tougher” bargainers 31
in the group helps reduce wasteful activities. A similar line of argument, however, reveals that
the social cost can actually increase in a more heterogenous group, when agreement requires 33
a less than unanimous approval. This is because unlike the unanimity rule, the most expensive
votes need not be bought out, raising the prize from proposing and consequently intensifying the 35
competition to propose.
3 There is a large literature on rent-seeking behavior in which a group of agents expends effort to win a given prize.
See, e.g., Nitzan [25] for a survey.
4 To my knowledge, the only other paper that allows players to expend effort to propose is Evans [13]. Extending the
coalitional bargaining framework introduced by Chatterjee et al. [8], Evans shows that the pure strategy subgame perfect
payoff set coincides with the core.A noteworthy feature of his model is that no equilibrium efforts are expended in pure
strategies.
Also related to my work is the literature, e.g., Perez-Castrillo andWettstein [28,29], which tries to implement the Shapley
value through a noncooperative game involving bidding for the right to propose. I elaborate on the link between my work
and this literature in the concluding section, when I discuss possible extensions.
5 See, for instance, Merlo and Wilson [23].
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Given the equilibrium social cost, a natural question is how voting rules affect it. Restricting 1
attention to symmetric agents, I ﬁnd that the social cost is lower, the closer the voting rule is to
the unanimity, implying the optimality of the unanimity rule. The intuition is that as the voting 3
rule becomes more inclusive, the prize from proposing gets smaller, reducing incentives to exert




Section 6 presents an extension where recognition probability also has an intrinsic component 9
anddemonstratestherobustnessofthemainresults.Finally,Section7offersconcludingremarks.
All proofs are contained in anAppendix. 11
2. The model
Consider a situation in which a group of agents decides how to allocate a perfectly divisi- 13
ble surplus of unit size among themselves. Let N ≡{ 1,2,...,n} denote the set of agents, and
S ≡{ (s1,s 2,...,s n)|∀i ∈ N,si0 and
 
i
si1} denote the set of feasible allocations, where
15
si is the share agent i receives. Assume that each agent is risk neutral, and that he discounts the
future returns and costs by i ∈[ 0,1). The interaction among agents is modeled as a sequential 17
bargaining game with complete information, where the proposer needs the consent of k players
(including himself) for his proposal to be agreed upon. This “k-majority” voting procedure cap- 19
tures a variety of bargaining environments. At one extreme, k = n refers to the unanimity rule
granting each player veto power. For a standard two-player setting, the unanimity rule follows 21
by deﬁnition. At the other extreme, k = 1 refers to a situation where the proposer becomes a
one-period dictator. When n is odd, k = n+1
2 refers to the simple majority rule. 23
Timingandinformationstructure:Atthebeginningofperiodt = 0,playerssimultaneouslyexert
efforts.Letxi,t 0 andCi(xi,t)representplayeri’seffortanditscost,respectively.Forsimplicity, 25
I assume Ci(xi,t) = cixi,t. Once efforts are chosen, player i is recognized with probability
pi(xi,t,x−i,t) to make a proposal from the set S. Each player then decides whether to “accept” 27
or “reject” the proposal according to a prespeciﬁed order. If at least k players accept, then the
proposal is implemented and the game ends. Otherwise, the proposal is rejected, and the game 29
repeats itself at t = 1 except that players choose their efforts again and a player is recognized. 6
This process continues until an allocation generates the required number of votes, whereupon 31





i Ci(xi,t ). If no agreement is ever reached, then all






Recognition probabilities: Given that our analysis builds on the literature on contests, e.g.,
Nitzan [25], the structure on the recognition probability closely follows the one on the “contest 35
success function” in that literature. In particular, I make the following assumptions:





cj ]→[ 0,1] be player i ’s recognition probability with
37
these properties:
(a) pi(x) is twice continuously differentiable in all arguments. 39
6 In Section 6, I brieﬂy discuss an extension in which effort has a persistent effect on recognition.
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pi (x) = 1, pi(0) = 1




xi pi(xi,  x−i) for xi > 0 and
1
x−i  x−i. 7











> 0 for j,k  = i.
(d) (Symmetry) pi(xi,x−i) = pi(xi,  x−i), where  x−i is any permutation of x−i. 5
Part (b) provides tie-breaking and boundary conditions in case of no effort by some agent(s).
Part (c) says that player i’s recognition probability increases in his own effort and decreases in 7
rivals’, both at a decreasing rate. Part (d) is an anonymity property implying that recognition
depends only on players’efforts, and not on their identities. In particular, if two players exert the 9
same effort, then their recognition probabilities must be equal.
Inwhatfollows,Iwillhavetofrequentlyimposemorestructureontherecognitionprobabilities, 11
inparticulartoguaranteetheuniquenessofequilibriumeffortsandpayoffs,andalsotocharacterize
the social cost. In such cases, I assume 8 13





cj ]→[ 0,1] be player i’s recognition probability, such that
pi(x) =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨





if x  = 0,
1
n
if x = 0, 15
where f(0) = 0, f  (xi)>0, f   (xi)0, and the elasticity of the “production function”, f,
deﬁned as ε(xi) ≡
f  (xi)xi
f(x i) is weakly decreasing. 17
Note thatA.2 holds for many well-known functions used in the rent-seeking literature, e.g., x
i
with ∈ (0,1],1−e−xi,andln(1+xi).Notealsothatthepropertiesoff(x i)implyε(xi) ∈ (0,1]. 19
However, these properties are not sufﬁcient for ε(xi) to be weakly decreasing.A counterexample
is f(x i) = xi + ln(1 + xi). 21
As alluded to in the Introduction, there are three noteworthy features of our model. First, it
endogenizes the recognition process. Absent strict institutional and organizational procedures 23
that assign the proposal rights, it is conceivable that agents will expend resources to claim the
rentsassociatedwithproposalpower.Here,Isimplyfollowtherent-seekingliteratureandassume 25
that agents compete for these rents. Indeed, at its core, this paper combines the two literatures
on multilateral bargaining with an exogenous recognition rule and the rent-seeking contests, 27
admitting each as a special case. On the one hand, when x = 0, the model reduces to the previous
models of sequential bargaining with an exogenous recognition process. 9 On the other hand, 29
when x  = 0, and players put no weight on the future or acceptance of a proposal requires only
one vote, the model coincides with the standard rent-seeking model, in which a group of players 31
7 Ideﬁnetheorderingrelation“”tobesuchthatforanytwovectorsa,b ∈ Rm,abifaj bj forallj ∈{ 1,...,m}.
Similarly, I will say a > b if aj >b j for all j ∈{ 1,...,m}.
8 This functional form is commonly assumed in the contest literature, and one axiomatic derivation can be found in
Skaperdas [35]. I could easily introduce heterogeneity in f; but this would be equivalent to cost heterogeneity and hence
not change the qualitative results.
9 I consider an extension that elaborates on this point in Section 6.
Please cite this article as: HuseyinYildirim, Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly
recognition, Journal of Economic Theory (2006), doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.008UNCORRECTED PROOF
6 H.Yildirim / Journal of Economic Theory ( ) –
YJETH3449
ARTICLE IN PRESS
compete to win a ﬁxed prize. In general, though, agents will compete to win the endogenous and 1
possibly different prizes from proposing that are determined through the bargaining process. 10
Second, our model assumes that effort has no long-lasting effect on recognition. This is a 3
reasonable approximation in cases where negotiating parties need to renew the support for their
proposals. For instance, in mediated bargaining, parties might have to repeat their efforts for the 5
recognition of their proposals, if the mediator is short-lived. 11 Third, players may differ both in
their discount factors (as is usual in many bargaining settings) and in their marginal costs. I will 7
show that in general, the two sources of heterogeneity will have different implications.
I now describe the solution concept. Let Ht be the history of the game that contains the identity 9
of proposers, proposals that have been made, and actions taken up to period t. In period t, player
i exerts effort xi,t(Ht) and takes action ai,t(Ht) such that 11
ai,t(Ht) ∈
 






period, and it is a SSPE, henceforth “equilibrium”, if it is both stationary and subgame perfect.
Intuitively, an SSPE calls for the same actions in each continuation game followed by rejection of 17
anofferonthetable.TherearethreemainreasonswhyIfocusontheSSPE.First,unlikethebilat-
eral bargaining game studied by Rubinstein [33], multilateral bargaining games entail a plethora 19
of SPE (see, e.g., [2,3,17,36]). However, the stationarity restriction often dramatically reduces
the equilibrium set and hence is widely used in the literature (see, e.g., [2,3,8,10,11,15,22,23]). 21
Second, an SSPE may entail the least “complexity” in certain bargaining games similar to the one
analyzed here [4] and therefore serve as a natural focal point. Third, it is analytically tractable. 23
To ﬁx intuition behind costly recognition and voting rules, I ﬁrst examine the case with the
unanimity rule, and relax this assumption in Section 4. 25
3. Unanimity rule
Suppose a proposal requires the unanimous approval of all agents in order to be implemented, 27
i.e., k = n. Let vi denote the expected equilibrium payoff for player i before efforts are chosen
andtheidentityoftheproposerisrevealed.Whennottheproposer,aplayerwillacceptaproposal 29
so long as he is allocated an amount no less than his continuation payoff. Since the proposer
maximizes his own share of the surplus, each nonproposer will be offered exactly this payoff, 31
resulting in no equilibrium delays. Thus, to determine the effort level, a player i needs to take
two possibilities into account. First, with probability pi(x), he is recognized to propose, in which 33
case he offers the continuation values to all other agents, i.e., jvj for all j  = i, while retaining
the rest of the surplus, 1 −
 
j =i
jvj, for himself. Second, with probability 1 − pi(x), someone
35
else is recognized, in which case he expects to receive his continuation value, ivi. Overall, the 37
10A strand of the rent-seeking literature, e.g., Leininger [20], and Nti [26], considers cases in which agents attach
different exogenous values to the prize.
11 Thereareotherbargainingsituationsinwhichagents’recognitionmightalsohaveapersistentcomponent.Iinvestigate
this possibility in Section 6.
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where superscript of n
i refers to the unanimity rule. Somewhat surprisingly, this prize is equal 9
across agents, irrespective of their discount factors. 12 The intuition is that when recognized to
be the proposer, player i receives 1 −
 
j =i
jvj after buying out the votes of all other agents.
11
However, since player i’s vote is not bought out by another player in this case, he also forgoes his
continuation value, ivi. The net prize for player i is thus the residual surplus after he pays for all 13
votes including his own.
Findingtheequilibriumundertheunanimityruleamountstoﬁndingapairof(x,v)thatsatisﬁes 15
(2)forallagents.Todistinguishtheseprizeandcosteffects,Iﬁrstconsiderthecasewhereplayers
differ only in their discount factors. 17
Proposition 1. Suppose pi(x) satisﬁesA.1 and ci = c for all i ∈ N. Then, under the unanimity
rule, there exists a unique equilibrium such that for all i,j ∈ N
19
• xi = xj > 0.
• pi(x) = pj(x) = 1
n. 21
• (1 − i)vi = (1 − j)vj.
The proofs of this and subsequent results are relegated to an appendix.As explained above, the 23
ﬁrst two parts of Proposition 1 follow because all agents expect to receive the same prize from
proposing,and,givenequalmarginalcosts,theyexertthesameeffort.Thisalsomeanseachagent 25
is equally likely to propose in equilibrium. The last part of Proposition 1 conﬁrms our intuition
that the more patient agent receives a higher equilibrium payoff, by simply being able to reject 27
unfavorable offers.
Whenagentsalsodifferintheirmarginalcostsofeffort,theresultsinProposition1aremodiﬁed 29
in an intuitive way. However, we somewhat forgo the generality by relying onA.2.
12 This fact has been also observed in the multilateral bargaining literature, e.g., Merlo and Wilson [23].
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Proposition 2. Suppose pi(x) satisﬁesA.2.Then, under the unanimity rule, there exists a unique 1
equilibrium with these properties: xl > 0 for some l ∈ N, and if ci <c j for some i,j ∈ N, then
• xixj, 3
• pi(x)pj(x),
• (1 − i)vi(1 − j)vj, 5
where strict inequality holds whenever xi > 0.
According to Proposition 2, agents take advantage of being more efﬁcient by expending a 7
greater effort to propose. Again, this is so regardless of their discount factors. The last part of
Proposition 2 implies that all else being equal, i.e., the discount factors are the same, the more 9
efﬁcient agent receives a greater payoff. However, it is possible that such an agent may end up
with a lower payoff if he is sufﬁciently impatient relative to others. This is intuitive because both 11
cost efﬁciency and patience are sources of bargaining power. I illustrate this point with a simple
example. 13 13
Example 1. Suppose there are two agents, i = 1,2 and pi(x) satisﬁes A.2 with f(x i) = xi.I t
is easy to verify that in equilibrium, both agents exert strictly positive efforts such that total costs 15
are equal and given by
cixi =
(1 − i)(1 − j)
ci
cj
(1 − i) +
cj
ci
(1 − j) + 2(1 − i)(1 − j)
. (4)
17
This implies agent i is recognized with probability pi =
cj
ci+cj . Moreover, agent i’s expected














(1 − i) + 2
ci
cj
(1 − i)(1 − j)
. (5)
Subtracting the expression in (4) from (5), we ﬁnd i’s expected payoff: 21
vi =
(1 − j)





(1 − i) + 2
ci
cj
(1 − i)(1 − j)
. (6)
Inspecting (4) and (5), it is clear that as agent i’s relative cost advantage increases, i.e., ci
cj gets 23
smaller,heproposeswithagreaterprobability,andgrabsalargersharefromthesurplus.Although
this might mean a higher total cost, his (net) expected payoff in (6) increases. The positive effect 25
of i’s relative cost advantage may, however, lose its strength with his relative impatience. In
particular, as j → 1, vi → 0, regardless of i’s cost advantage. 27
Animportantaspectofourmodelisthatagentsengageinsociallywastefulactivitiestoincrease
their chances of recognition. Not surprisingly, the extent of social cost depends on parameters of 29
13 The details of this and other examples are available from the author upon request.
14 Clearly, the expected share is si = pi[1 − jvj]+(1 − pi)ivi.
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the bargaining environment, especially on the group heterogeneity and the number of agents. To 1
see the impact of each parameter, I ﬁrst compute the equilibrium social cost, SC.




















where pi(x) ≡ (1 − ε(xi))pi(x) + ε(xi)(pi(x))2.
Using the concept of the mean-preserving spread as the measure of heterogeneity in the group 7
with respect to the parameter in question, 15 the following result records the properties of the
social cost. 9
Proposition 3. Suppose pi(x) satisﬁes A.2 and the voting rule is unanimity.
• Given ci = c for all i ∈ N, SC decreases with the group heterogeneity in i’s. 11
• Given i =  for all i ∈ N, and f(x i) = xi, SC decreases with the group heterogeneity in ci’s.
• Given ci = c and i =  for all i ∈ N, SC increases with n. 13
To understand Proposition 3, I ﬁrst note that all else being equal, an agent’s equilibrium payoff
increases at an increasing rate in his discount factor. 16 This is because a higher discount factor 15
improves one’s bargaining power not only in the current period but also in every period following
a rejection, all of which then feed back into the equilibrium payoff.Armed with this observation, 17
the intuition behind the ﬁrst part of Proposition 3 easily follows: As the group becomes more
heterogenousintimepreferences,itcontainsagentswithdiscountfactorsclosertobothextremes. 19
Although the presence of less patient agents who, according to Proposition 1, demand a lower
share from the surplus raises the prize from proposing, the presence of more patient agents 21
reducesit,totheextentthattheoverallprize,i.e.,n
i ,issmaller,andsoistheincentivetopropose.
Put differently, the presence of “tough” bargainers who refuse to settle for little helps reduce 23
wasteful efforts. 17 Indeed, as some agent i becomes arbitrarily patient, the social cost vanishes,
i.e., SC → 0, for i → 1. However, it is also the agent i in this case who beneﬁts most from 25
the cost savings, since vi → 1 for i → 1.A similar intuition holds for cost heterogeneity. 18 In
particular, a lower marginal cost raises one’s payoff not only because of its direct effect but also 27
because of its strategic effect. Finally, the competition becomes more intense in a larger group, as
15 In general,   = ( 
1,..., 










i and (2)  
j   
j






i for j ∈ N.
16 This property can be easily veriﬁed in general, and it also holds for the standard two-agent Rubinstein bargaining.
17 The rent-seeking literature also recognizes the fact that unevenly matched contenders might waste fewer resources.
See, e.g., Che and Gale [9], Esteban and Ray [12], Leininger [20], and Nti [26]. Viewed as a one-shot rent-seeking
game in equilibrium, agents in the present bargaining setup are identical with respect to the prize they compete for. The
heterogeneity comes into play in determining the endogenous prize.
18Although the analysis of cost heterogeneity requires an additional restriction that f(xi) = xi, I conjecture it will hold
in general.Yet, I have been unable to prove this.
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recorded in the last part of Proposition 3. The reason is that as the number of negotiating agents 1
increases, they expect recognition to be costlier and therefore have lower continuation values.
This raises the prize from proposing by making votes cheaper to buy out 19 and consequently 3
heats up the competition to propose.
The role of group heterogeneity in reducing the social cost can provide an alternative expla- 5
nation as to why organizations may treat identical agents unequally. For instance, professional
partnershipsandacademicdepartmentsassigntitlessuchasassociateandseniorassociatetotheir 7
members, which make some members more permanent in the organization than others. These ti-
tles often are not linked to signiﬁcant job differences, and as the model predicts, more permanent 9
members receive a greater share from the surplus. 20
4. k-Majority rule 11
Inowrelaxtheunanimityruleassumptiongrantingeachagentvetopower,andextendtheframe-
work to general voting procedures in which a proposal requires k ∈{ 1,...,n} votes (including 13
the proposer’s) to be accepted. The analysis, however, becomes signiﬁcantly more complicated.
This is because a proposer wants to buy out the votes of the cheapest “winning coalition”, which 15
may vary across agents.
Let ij be the probability that player i includes j in his offer or winning coalition. We modify 17
(1)asfollows.Ifplayeri isrecognizedwithpi(x),thenhepaysthecontinuationvaluesofplayers





If player i is not recognized, however, he will be offered his continuation value, as long as he 21






and 0i(x)1 − pi(x).





pi(x)(1 − wi) + i(x)ivi − cixi
 
. (10)





i − ci0 (= 0i fxi > 0), (11)
19 Indeed, given i =  for all i, n
i = 1 − nvi increases in n.
20 In a recent paper, Winter [38] provides an alternative incentive-based explanation for the same phenomenon. He
argues that identical agents each performing a complementary task may be rewarded differently for a successful project
to minimize the coordination problem among them.








f(xj) ji, which is independent of xi, it is clear that the SOC holds.
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where the prize from proposing is now k
i ≡ 1 − wi −
i
1−pi ivi and I make use of the facts 1
pi
xi = ε(xi)
xi pi(1 − pi) and
pj
xi =− ε(xi)




1−wi, to be gained from being the proposer and the forgone expected payment,
i





do not necessarily compete for the same prize under a k-majority rule, because each proposer
may include a different set of k − 1 players in the proposal. Nonetheless, it seems intuitive that 9
agents with relatively more expensive votes would expect to be excluded from winning coalitions
and thus would have more to gain from proposing. The following result conﬁrms this intuition 11
and provides an additional insight.
Lemma 2. Suppose the voting rule is k-majority and pi(x) satisﬁes A.2. Moreover, suppose, in 13
equilibrium, one of the following two conditions holds: for some i,j ∈ N,
• jvj < ivi, or 15
• jvj = ivi, j i and cicj.
Then, in equilibrium, k
j k
i. 17
Recall that when not the proposer, player i’s vote can be bought out by paying him his con-
tinuation payoff, ivi. Thus, the ﬁrst part of Lemma 2 provides a convenient comparison of the 19
prizes based on the “prices” of agents’votes. The second part reveals that even if the equilibrium
prices of two agents’votes are equal, they might expect different prizes from proposing. This is 21
because the more patient and/or more efﬁcient agent is supposed to have a greater off-equilibrium
continuation value, and thus he is more likely to be excluded from winning coalitions.This raises 23
hisstakesfromproposing,andinduceshimtoincuragreatereffortcost,which,inturn,lowershis
off-equilibrium continuation value. (This point is illustrated in Example 2 below.) The following 25
proposition further reﬁnes our intuition.
Proposition 4. Suppose pi(x) satisﬁes A.2. Then, under a k-majority voting rule, there exists a 27
uniqueequilibriumpairof(x,v)andithastheseproperties:xl > 0 forsomel ∈ N,andifj i










23 Indeed, as alluded to earlier, in equilibrium, the bargaining game reduces to a one-shot rent-seeking game where
player i wins the prize k
i . Note also that
i
1−pi is the probability that player i is in the winning coalition conditional on
not proposing.
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Dissipation of cost advantage
Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3
ci 11 .02 1.05
vi .159 .159 .159
pi .364 .337 .299
i .804 .787 .766
i .234 .322 .443
effort to propose, as recorded in the rest of the proposition. In terms of the equilibrium, there is 1
a trivial multiplicity (see also [2,3]). 24 Yet, the equilibrium effort and payoffs are unique, which
serves our purposes. 25 3
While Proposition 4 provides a clear and intuitive comparison of agents’equilibrium continua-
tion values, it is also important to compare their expected payoffs, vi. Observe that if i = j for 5
agents i and j, then Proposition 4 implies that the more efﬁcient agent obtains a weakly higher
payoff. Under the unanimity rule, this inequality becomes strict whenever the agents in question 7
exert positive efforts (Proposition 2). However, it turns out that the same is not true for a nonuna-
nimity rule. That is, even if i = j and ci <c j for some i,j ∈ N, it is possible that vi = vj.I 9
illustrate this point and the role of cost heterogeneity on the social cost in the following example,
and then turn my attention to the case where agents have equal costs but different discount factors 11
in Example 3.
Example 2. Consider a three-agent bargaining, where agreement requires a simple majority, i.e., 13

















if and only if c1(c2 +c3)−c2c30. That is, an equal-payoff equilibrium exists if only if agents’
marginal costs are not too different. To better explain the intuition, I consider the following 19
numerical example with  = .9 summarized in Table 1. Inspecting Table 1, note, for instance,
that agent 1, being the most efﬁcient, is expected to propose with the highest probability and have 21
the highest (off-equilibrium) continuation payoff, which makes his vote the least desirable by
others, as reﬂected in i’s.This in turn makes his prize from proposing the highest, and leads him 23
to exert the highest effort, dissipating his initial cost advantage. As noted above, there is also a
trivial multiplicity of equilibria here. In particular, agents form their coalitions with these mixed 25
strategies: 12 = .821(.078 + 31) and 21 = .886(.782 − 31) for 31 ∈[ 0,.782].
24 Example 2 demonstrates this trivial multiplicity of equilibria.
25 Eraslan [10] shows the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the Baron and Ferejohn model with an exogenous
recognition rule.
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Table 2
Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3
(a)
ci .81 1 .2
vi .223 .137 .136
pi .504 .361 .135
i .877 .851 .753
i 0 .135 .865
(b)
ci .71 1 .3
vi .307 .143 .037
pi .564 .369 .067
i .966 .952 .837
i 0 .067 .933
The possibility of an increase in social cost with cost heterogeneity: Let us ﬁrst examine 1
the impact of cost heterogeneity on the social cost when, in equilibrium, agents end up with
equal payoffs. Since 1
1+pi is decreasing and convex in pi, the payoff vi in (12) increases in 3
cost heterogeneity, leading to a lower social cost
 
i
cixi = 1 −
 
i
vi. This similarity to the
case with unanimity rule (Proposition 3) comes from the fact that all agents have a positive and 5
signiﬁcant probability of being included in winning coalitions, which curbs their incentives to
propose. However, unlike the unanimity rule, when cost heterogeneity is so severe that low-cost 7
agents are excluded in the others’offers, this conclusion may be reversed with the majority rule.
I now demonstrate this point by allowing agents’ marginal costs to be sufﬁciently different so 9
that in equilibrium v3 <v 2 <v 1. In terms of cost heterogeneity, I consider the following mean-
preserving spread on marginal costs: c1 + c3 = 2 and c2 = 1. The equilibrium outcomes for two 11
cases are reported in Table 2a and b.






vi, goes up from .504 to
13
.513,asthegroupbecomesmoreheterogenous.Theintuitionisthatamoreheterogenousgroupin
Table 2b contains a more efﬁcient agent 1 and a less efﬁcient agent 3. While this means a greater 15
payoff for 1 and a lower payoff for 3, contrary to the case with the unanimity rule, it increases
the stakes from proposing for all agents. This is because the most expensive vote of agent 1 is not 17
needed by others.
Next, I turn my attention to the impact of patience on the equilibrium outcome with majority 19
rule. To do so, I assume that agents possess equal marginal costs but different discount factors.
Under the unanimity rule, Proposition 1 implies that the more patient agent necessarily receives a 21
greater payoff. Under a nonunanimity rule, however, this is not true. Furthermore, unlike the case
with heterogenous costs, although the more patient agent obtains a weakly higher continuation 23
value, he may end up with a lower payoff than a less patient agent. I demonstrate these points by
continuing the setup in Example 2. 25
Example 3. Consider again a three-agent bargaining, where agreement requires a simple ma-
jority, and pi(x) satisﬁes A.2 with f(x i) = xi. Also, let ci = 1 for all i. Suppose the equilib- 27
rium continuation values are such that 1v1 < 2v2 < 3v3. If recognized in a given period,
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agent 1 then offers an allocation (s1,s 2,s 3) = (1 − 2v2,2v2,0) whereas agents 2 and 3 offer 1
(1v1,1−1v1,0) and (1v1,0,1− 1v1), respectively. These allocations imply (a) w1 = 2v2,
w2 = w3 = 1v1, and (b) 1 = 1 − p1, 2 = p1, 3 = 0. 3
Disadvantages of being patient: It can be veriﬁed that in equilibrium, recognition probabilities





























Moreover, the following equation uniquely identiﬁes 1







1 − 2p1(1 + p2)
. (14)
Since there is no convenient closed-form solution to (14), however, I proceed by ﬁxing 2. 26 9
Let 2 = .6. Then, (14) reveals 1
3 = .911, which in turn reveals p1 = .301,p 2 = .336, and
p3 = .363. Moreover, from (10) and (11), we have v1
v2 = 0.554
1−1 and v2
v3 = 1.131. The initial 11
equilibrium condition 1v1 < 2v2 < 3v3 we imposed is now satisﬁed if 1 ∈[ 0,.519) and
3 ∈[ .678,1). With these restrictions in mind, we ﬁnd v1
v2 > 1 if and only if 1.446. In sum, 13
for 1 ∈[ 0,.519], 2 = .6 and 3 ∈[ .678,1),w eh a v e1v1 < 2v2 < 3v3 and
v1v2 >v 3 if 1 ∈[ .446,.519), 15
v2 >v 1v3 if 1 ∈[ .373,.446),
v2 >v 3 >v 1 if 1 ∈[ 0,.373). (15) 17
As a benchmark, I also consider the case where recognition is costless, and pi = 1
3 for all i.
For 2 = .6, 1 ∈[ 0,.5) and 3 ∈[ .75,1), we have the equilibrium with 1  v1 < 2  v2 < 3  v3, 19
and
  v1  v2 >   v3 if 1 ∈[ .4,.5), 21
  v2 >   v1  v3 if 1 ∈[ .25,.4),
  v2 >   v3 >   v1 if 1 ∈[ 0,.25). (16) 23
Twoinsightsemergefromthediscussionsofar.First,theimpactofpatiencelevelonequilibrium
payoffschangesdramaticallywiththevotingrule.Inparticular,theagentwhoismorepatientdoes 25
not necessarily receive a higher payoff, when agreement requires a less than unanimous approval.
In fact, for certain values of discount factors, the lowest payoff accrues to the most patient agent, 27
i.e., agent 3. 27 The intuition is that by being patient, agent 3 is expected to possess a greater
continuation payoff, making his vote more expensive. With the majority voting rule, however, 29
this means agent 3 is excluded from the offers, when he is not the proposer. Second, comparing
(15) and (16), we see that when agents can inﬂuence their recognition, a more patient agent is 31
26After some simpliﬁcation, (14) reduces to 2(
1
3 )3 − 3(3 − 2)(
1
3 )2 + 3(3 − 22)(
1
3 ) + 2 = 0.
27 This observation might seem puzzling in light of Corollary 2 of Eraslan [10], in which she notes, given the exogenous
recognition rule pi = 1
n and under general voting rules, patient agents cannot be worse off. I am grateful to Hulya Eraslan
for pointing out an error in her ﬁnding.
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able to tip the proposal power in his favor, and reduce the disadvantage of being excluded from 1
the offers. For instance, for 1 ∈[ .25,.373], 2 = .6 and 3 ∈[ .75,1), whereas  v1  v3,w eh a v e
v3 >v 1. 3
The possibility of an increase in social cost with discount factor heterogeneity: Let us make
the following mean-preserving spread on discount factors: 2 = .6 and 1 + 3 = 1, where 5
1 ∈[ 0,.519] and 3 ∈[ .678,1). Clearly, as 1 decreases and 3 increases, the group becomes






pi(1 − pi)i. Eq.
7
(14) reveals that 1
3depends only on 2, and from (13), so do pi’s. Moreover, using the deﬁnition
of i’s, we obtain 9
1 =
1 − 
















1−2p1(1+p2) and 	 ≡ 1
1−1p2
1.
Note that as the group becomes more heterogenous, all i’s and hence the social cost increase. 11
Thisisinsharpcontrastwiththeﬁndingundertheunanimityrule(Proposition2)thatheterogeneity
in discounting always lowers social cost. The reason is twofold. First, unlike the unanimity rule, 13
the presence of a more patient agent 3 has no cost-reducing effect, since his expensive vote need
not be bought out under the majority rule. Second, as agent 1 becomes less patient, his vote gets 15
cheaper, which raises the prize from proposing and intensiﬁes the competition to propose.
5. Voting rules and distribution of surplus 17
Up to now, my analysis has focused on agents’ equilibrium payoffs net of recognition costs.
Perhaps equally important is the distribution of surplus, and it is well-known that the distri- 19
bution is skewed toward the proposer’s favor, as he gains a (temporary) monopoly power over
nonproposers. 28 The extent of this power, however, hinges critically on the nonproposers’ability 21
torejectanofferandwaitforfutureones.Toinvestigatevariousfactorsthataffecttheequilibrium
distribution of surplus, I restrict the previous analysis and assume that agents are identical, i.e., 23
ci = c and i =  for all i ∈ N. Thus, there is a unique equilibrium pair of (x, v) such that all
agents (a) possess the same payoff, v, (b) exert the same effort, x, and (c) propose with equal 25
probability,i.e.,pi = 1
n.Inwhatfollows,itisalsomoreconvenienttorepresentvotingrulesasthe
“r-majority”,bydeﬁningk ≡ rn+(1−r)forsomer ∈[ 0,1]. 29 Forinstance,theunanimityand 27
the simple majority rules are equivalent to r = 1 and 1
2, respectively. Since each player is equally
likelytobeinawinningcoalitionwhennottheproposer,ij = k−1
n−1 = r andi = k−1
n = r(n−1)
n . 29
28An obvious source of this monopoly power is nonproposers’discounting of the future. For nonunanimity voting rules,
even if they do not discount the future, nonproposers may still value the future less, because of the fear of not being
included in the winning coalition.
29 In particular, the comparative static with respect to n becomes obscure with the k-majority, because k itself is often a
function of n.
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From (17), it is clear that in the absence of costly recognition, i.e., x → 0, each agent receives 3
an ex ante payoff of v = 1
n, regardless of the voting rule and agents’ patience [2]. The reason
is that without costly recognition, there are no equilibrium inefﬁciencies. The following result 5
summarizes how x (and hence v in (17)) changes with various parameters.
Proposition 5. Suppose that ci = c and i =  for all i ∈ N, and that pi(x) satisﬁesA.2. Then, 7
there is a unique and symmetric equilibrium pair of (x, v) such that v increases in r and , and
decreases in n whereas x decreases in r and , and ncx increases in n. 9
When recognition is costly, Proposition 5 reveals that v increases and x decreases in r.A s
agreementrequiresmoreafﬁrmativevotes,itimprovesnotonlysocialefﬁciencybut,interestingly, 11
the individual payoff as well. The intuition is that whereas an increase in r reduces the payoff by
requiring the proposer to buy out more votes, it also collectively and credibly commits agents not 13
to exert too much effort by lowering the prize from proposing. 30 As a third effect, an increase in
r also makes it more likely for a nonproposer to be included in an offer. Overall, the two positive 15
effects associated with an increase in r outweigh the negative effect, and hence the individual
payoff goes up. Similarly, when agents are more patient, their expected payoffs and hence the 17
continuation values increase, making their votes more expensive. This in turn reduces the prize
from proposing and the effort to propose, beneﬁting all agents. The last part of Proposition 5 19
reveals that as n increases, given more intense competition, so does the total cost, ncx. This,
however, reduces the individual payoff, v, as expected. 31 21
In equilibrium, the surplus is divided between agents, in particular, between the proposer and
nonproposers.Theproposerreceivesashareofsp ≡1−(k−1)v = 1−r(n−1)v,whereaseach 23
nonproposer expects to receive snp ≡ k−1
n−1 v = rv. Thus, the expected gain from proposing is
 ≡ sp − snp = 1 − rnv. (18) 25
Corollary 1.  decreases in  and r, and increases in n.
To understand Corollary 1, note ﬁrst that for x → 0, Eq. (18) reduces to 0 = 1−r. That is, 27
in the absence of costly recognition, since nonproposers’payoffs are proportional to surplus, the
expected gain from proposing is independent of n. Furthermore, since nonproposers possess a 29
greatercontinuationpayoffwhentheyaremorepatientand/oradecisionrequiresmoreunanimous
agreement, 0 is decreasing in  and r. 32 In the presence of costly recognition, how much non- 31
proposers demand also depends on the degree of competition to propose. In particular, any factor
30 It is easy to verify that the equilibrium prize from proposing is r
i = 1 − rnv and given that v increases in r,i t
decreases in r.
31 It is interesting to note that the effect of n on x is, in general, ambiguous (see Proof of Proposition 5). This is because
as n increases, while each agent expects to propose with a lower probability, he also expects to receive a greater prize
from proposing. The latter force is absent when  = 0o rr = 0, in which case the competition reduces to a one-shot
rent-seeking game.
32 These observations are consistent with Harrington [16], who also considers the equilibrium distribution of surplus in
a symmetric model much like Baron and Ferejohn [1,2] but with risk-averse players.
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that intensiﬁes the competition lowers future (off-equilibrium) payoffs, and therefore provides 1
the proposer with an additional monopoly power over nonproposers.As with the unanimity case,
an increase in n and/or a decrease in  result in a greater competition, as recorded in Proposition 3
5. Similarly, as agreement requires more afﬁrmative votes, the expected continuation payoff goes
up for nonproposers, which reduces the proposer’s expected gain. 5
Before proceeding, it is interesting to relate our results in this section to those of Inderst et al.




intra-divisional levels. The main reason is that intra-divisional rent-seeking takes place only for a 11
fraction of the overall prize. In the same vein, Muller andWarneryd [24] argue that in the absence
of complete contracts, managers of a ﬁrm might prefer outside ownership to reduce internal 13
conﬂict between them by essentially committing to lowering the prize to ﬁght for. Combining
these insights with my ﬁndings reveals the following testable observations: Organizations and 15
ﬁrms that require more consensus in resource allocation are (a) less likely to divisionalize, and
(b) less likely to beneﬁt from outside ownership. 33 17
6. An extension: costly recognition with persistence
The analysis thus far has assumed that the recognition probabilities depend only on the current 19
efforts.Thisseemsagoodapproximationincaseswhereagentsneedto“push”fortheirproposals
repeatedly.Forinstance,nationsdisputingoveraterritorymighthavetogeneraterepeatedsupport 21
from the same countries with frequently changing leadership. Nonetheless, in many other cases,
recognition appears to have a persistent or intrinsic component as well. For instance, negotiating 23
agentsmighthavealreadyestablishedsomerecognitiononaspeciﬁcissue,buttheircurrentefforts
play a role, too. To capture this possibility, I now assume agent i is recognized with probability 25
qi(x) that satisﬁes 34 :
A.3. qi(x) = 
i+(1−
)pi(x),where









The bargaining model with qi(x) literally combines the one with exogenous probabilities, i, 29
and the one examined above, admitting each as a special case. Thus, I only examine cases with

 ∈ (0,1) here. To see the potential impact of this generalization, consider ﬁrst the case with the 31
































⎦ −  ci0 (= 0i fxi > 0). (20)
35
33 Note that the voting procedure has no bite in the static models of Inderst et al., and Muller and Warneryd.
34 I am grateful to a referee for suggesting this extension.
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In particular, for ci = c for all i, we once again have xi = xj and pi = pj = 1




n andthatifi > j,thenqiqj and(1−i)vi(1−j)vj. 3
When agents also differ in their marginal costs, Proposition 2 follows with a slight modiﬁcation,
too. For instance, if ci <c j, then (20) reveals that xixj and thus pipj. One then needs to 5
compare qi and qj using the information on i and j.
When the voting rule is less than unanimity, it turns out that the impact of the persistence in 7
recognition is similar to that of the marginal cost. To see this, let agents differ only in their i’s.
Intuitively,theagentwithahigheri isexpectedtoproposewithagreaterprobability,andpossess 9
a greater expected net payoff.This, however, makes his vote more expensive for others to buy out
and gives him an additional incentive to expend effort to propose. I conﬁrm this intuition in the 11
following result.
Proposition 6. Suppose that i =  and ci = c for all i and that pi(x) and qi(x) satisfy A.2 and 13
A.3 with 
 ∈ (0,1), respectively. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium pair of (x,v) such that
if i > j, then
15
• xixj.
• qi(x)>q j(x). 17
• vivj.
The discussion so far suggests that the extension using A.3 does not alter our previous results 19
with 
 = 0 in any qualitative way. As expected, all else equal, the agent with a greater intrinsic
recognition proposes with a greater probability and is weakly better off. Perhaps, an interesting 21
new insight is that, all else being equal, the agent with a greater intrinsic recognition tends to
reinforce his proposal power by exerting a greater effort. 23
Relatedtothisextension,onecanalsoimaginethattheintrinsiccomponentitselfisdetermined
by the current and past efforts. That is, agent i’s intrinsic recognition in period t ∈{ 0,1,...} is 25
given by i,t = i(X1,t,...,Xn,t), where Xi,t = (xi,0,x i,1,...,x i,t−1) denotes i’s effort history
with xi,−1 = 0.While a full development of this generalization is beyond the scope of this paper, 27
the following example demonstrates the value of future research in this direction.
Example 4. Consider the two-agent setup in Example 1, but now suppose agents simultaneously 29
choose their efforts once-and-for-all in period 0. These efforts are then observed by both agents,
and they determine agents’ recognition probabilities in the subsequent bargaining game. In the 31
unique equilibrium, both agents choose strictly positive efforts, and the total cost for agent i is
given by 33
ci  xi =
(1 − i)(1 − j)
ci
cj
(1 − i)2 +
cj
ci
(1 − j)2 + 2(1 − i)(1 − j)
. (21)
This means that as in Example 1, agent i proposes with pi =
cj
ci+cj . His expected share from the 35
surplus is
  si =
1 − j
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Subtracting (21) from (22), we compute i’s expected payoff: 1
  vi =
(1 − j)2





(1 − i)2 + 2
ci
cj
(1 − i)(1 − j)
. (23)
It is clear that the qualitative properties of ci  xi,  si, and   vi are the same as in Example 1. How- 3
ever, comparing the equilibrium outcomes across two examples yields insights into the role of
persistence. First, although agents end up proposing with equal probabilities in both cases, they 5
do exert greater efforts when efforts have a persistent effect on recognition. Formally,  xixi with
strict inequality when i  = 0. The reason is that knowing that the current effort will determine 7
the recognition throughout the bargaining, agents expect a higher marginal return on their invest-
ments. Second, from (5) and (22), it follows that  si > si if and only if cii >c jj. That is, the 9
more efﬁcient and/or more patient agent grabs a larger share from the surplus when efforts are
persistent, making the allocation more unequal. The intuition is that when efforts are transitory, 11
agents know that after every rejection, they will waste resources to be recognized. To avoid this
possibility, the advantageous agent is willing to make a more generous offer to the other, which 13
leads to a more equal allocation. Finally, comparing (6) and (23), we see that vi  vi if and only
if 2j(1 − j) + ci
cj (j − i)0. This condition clearly holds if j i. That is, the less patient 15
agent strictly prefers the case with the transitory effect. This makes sense. In such a case, the
less patient agent not only exerts less effort, but he also obtains a more generous offer. However, 17
whether the more patient agent is better off with the case of persistence is not clear. For instance,
if j < i and j ≈ i, it is true that vi >   vi. On the other hand, if j < i and j ≈ 0, then 19
vi <   vi. The source of this ambiguity is that all else being equal, while a more patient agent
obtains a greater share when efforts have a persistent effect, he also incurs a greater effort cost. 21
Which way this ambiguity is resolved thus depends on the other agent’s relative impatience.
7. Concluding remarks 23
A fundamental task of economic analysis is to understand how resources are allocated between
agents with conﬂicting preferences. This task becomes particularly challenging when complete 25
contracts are unavailable. The sequential bargaining and rent-seeking literatures offer comple-
mentary frameworks to predict the allocation in the absence of complete contracts. In this paper, 27
I have combined the insights from the two literatures to shed new light on many real negotiations
where, as in the rent-seeking literature, players expend efforts to claim the rents associated with 29
proposal power—a key prediction of the bargaining literature.
Theanalysis,however,hasmaintainedsomestrongassumptions,andrelaxingthemmightyield 31
additional insights. For one, the recognition probabilities are assumed to take the speciﬁc func-
tional form inA.2. Opening up this “black box” may provide further insights. For instance, in an 33
interesting line of research, Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein [28,29] investigate the implementation
of Shapley value through noncooperative behavior. In their mechanism, agents initially bid to 35
be the proposer, and then the winner proposes how to share the coalition’s surplus. However, it
is important in their setup that bids be paid to nonproposers and be independent of subsequent 37
sharing of the surplus. Although, in our setup, bids are wasted resources, one can imagine these
bids given to a mediator, who is an unproductive agent. Moreover, a k-majority rule restricts the 39
sizeofthecoalitiontoachievefullproduction,andanysmallersizecoalitionobtainszerosurplus.
In this more abstract framework, it would be interesting to see whether an agent’s equilibrium 41
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payoff reﬂects a modiﬁed version of Shapley value. Second, it would be desirable to generalize 1
the result on the socially optimal voting rule to an environment with heterogenous agents.
Aside from the extension in Section 6, our model can be fruitfully extended in various other 3
ways. For instance, the present setting assumes that agents’ efforts are unproductive and thus
socially undesirable. It would be interesting to investigate a setting where agents allocate their 5
resources between productive activities to increase the surplus and unproductive activities to
propose. 35 Inaddition,inmanyrealworldnegotiations,agentsformbindingcoalitionsor“voting 7
blocks”. Using the insights from the recent literature on endogenous coalition formation, 36 it
would be useful to see the impact of costly recognition and voting rules on the equilibrium 9
number and sizes of coalitions.
Appendix A. 11
I ﬁrst note two useful results that hold in a one-shot rent-seeking game with exogenous prizes.
Lemma A1. In a one-shot rent-seeking game in which pi(x) satisﬁes A.1, ci = c for all i ∈ N, 13
andthewinnerreceivesanexogenousprizeofsize1,thereexistsauniquepurestrategyequilibrium
such that xi = xj > 0 and pi(x) = pj(x) = 1
n for all i,j ∈ N. 15
Proof. Let Ri(x−i) = arg max
xi∈[0,1
c]
[pi(xi,x−i) − cxi] be agent i’s reaction function. Given A.1,
Ri(x−i) :[ 0, 1
c]n−1 →[ 0, 1
c] is well-deﬁned, and in particular continuous. Thus, standard ﬁxed 17
point arguments imply that there exists a pure strategy equilibrium. Observe that x = 0 cannot
be an equilibrium. Otherwise, given x−i = 0, agent i could choose a small xi > 0 and receive 19
the prize with probability 1 by part (b) ofA.1. Next, note that in any equilibrium, xi > 0 for all i.
Suppose, on the contrary, xk = 0 for some k.Also, let xl > 0 for some l in the same equilibrium. 21













xl . But this 23
contradicts part (b) ofA.1.
Now, take any two agents i and j and restrict attention to x > 0. From the FOCs, reaction 25
functions for i and j satisfy
pi
xi





This means reaction functions for i and j must be symmetric about the 45-degree line for any














(x,...,x)<0, it follows that
pi
xi (x,...,x) 31
is decreasing in x. Hence, the equilibrium must be unique. 
35 Skaperdas [34] studies a model in this direction but not in a bargaining framework.
36 See, for instance, Bloch [6], Bloch et al. [7], Ray and Vohra [31,32], Maskin [21], and Okada [27].
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Lemma A2. Inaone-shotrent-seekinggameinwhichpi(x)satisﬁesA.2,andthewinnerreceives 1




for some i, j ∈ N, then xixj and thus pi(x)pj(x) (with strict inequality whenever xi > 0). 3
Proof. Szidarovski and Okuguchi [37] show the existence of a unique pure strategy equilibrium
in a one-shot rent-seeking game with the following properties: (1) the winner receives a prize 5
normalized to 1, (2) pi(x) satisﬁesA.2 with f(x i) = xi, and (3) the cost of effort is gi(xi), where
gi(0) = 0, g 
i > 0, and g  
i 0. Moreover, x = 0 cannot be an equilibrium. Now note that the 7
one-shot contest described in LemmaA2 is equivalent to the contest in Szidarovski and Okuguchi
[37], where gi(xi) = f −1( ci








j xj. Moreover, since f −1(.) is increasing and weakly convex, we have ci




j f −1 (
cj




























































 2 < 0,
15
a contradiction. Hence, xixj and pi(x)pj(x). Finally, if xi > 0, these inequalities must be
strict. Otherwise, we would have xi = xj > 0 for which, given ci
i <
cj
j , the FOCs would yield 17
a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose pi(x) satisﬁes A.1, and ci = c for all i ∈ N. Let v be a 19
stationary payoff vector. Since each agent has veto power, we can restrict attention to v0.
Moreover, by deﬁnition, we must have
 
i
vi1 and thus n ≡ 1 −
 
i
ivi > 0. Lemma A1
21
implies that there is a unique and symmetric solution to (3), i.e., xi = x(n,c)>0, and pi = 1
n
for all i ∈ N in equilibrium. Inserting this fact into (2) yields 23
(1 − i)vi =
1
n
n − cx(n,c). (A.1)
This immediately shows the last part. To prove the existence and uniqueness of v,w er e - 25
write (A.1): ivi = i
1−i [1











1−i for n ∈
27
(0,1].NoteF(1)0andlimn→0 F(n) = 1 > 0.Moreover,itiswell-establishedinthecontest
literature that the equilibrium expected net payoff in a one-shot game, 1
nn−cx(n,c), is weakly 29
increasing in n, revealing that F (n)<0. Hence, there exists a unique solution to F(n) = 0.
Using this solution, Eq. (A.1) uniquely generates v as well as x.  31
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to (3), i.e., xi = xi(n,c i), with at least one agent with a strictly positive effort. Suppose ci <c j 3
for some i,j ∈ N. From Lemma A2, it follows that xi xj and thus pipj in equilibrium. To
show the last part, we substitute for cixi from (3) in (2) to obtain 5




0) and increasing in pi(x). Given that ε (xi)0 by A.2, it follows that pi(x) is increasing in xi.
From (A.2), this implies (1−i)vi(1−j)vj. To prove the existence and uniqueness of v,w e 9









for n ∈ (0,1]. Note G(1)0 and G(0)>0. Moreover, pin is the net payoff in a one-shot 11
contest with a prize n, and it is well-known that this payoff is weakly increasing in the prize.
Thus, we also have G (n)<0, implying a unique solution to G(n) = 0. Using this solution, 13
(A.2) uniquely identiﬁes v and x. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Using (A.2) and recalling n = 1 −
 
i















. Since SC =
 
i
cixi = 1 −
 
i
vi, we obtain the expres-
sion in (7).  17
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose pi(x) satisﬁes A.2. To prove the ﬁrst part, let ci = c for all i.
From Proposition 1, this implies pi = 1
n. Inserting this fact into (7) yields 19
SC = ncx =
n(n − 1)ε(x)






Let   = ( 
1,..., 
n) be a mean-preserving spread of    = (  
1,...,  









i and (2)  
j   



















To do so, I utilize second-order stochastic dominance arguments by deﬁning a random variable, 23
  , such that P{   = i}=1
n. Note that    second-order stochastically dominates    if and only
if   is a mean-preserving spread of   . Moreover, since h(i) = 1
1−i is a convex function, it 25












. Now, suppose, on
the contrary, that x x  . This implies SC SC   and ε(x )ε(x  ). Since SC is increasing in 27




1−i , it must be that SC  < SC  , a contradiction. Hence x  <x    and
SC  < SC  . 29
To prove the second part, suppose i =  for all i and f(x i) = xi. This implies ε(xi) = 1 and
hence pi = p2
i . Using (7), we ﬁnd that pi = 1 − (n − 1) ci  
j∈P+
cj where P+ ={ i ∈ N|pi > 0}.
31
Now, let c  = (c 
1,...,c 
n) be a mean-preserving spread of c   = (c  
1,...,c  
n), which means p  is
a mean-preserving spread of p  . Deﬁne the random variable   p such that Pr{  p = pi}=1
n. Since 33
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g(pi) = p2













i , it follows that SC  < SC  .
To prove the last part, let ci = c and i =  for all i. Differentiating both sides of (A.3), we 3
ﬁrst note that x is decreasing, and hence ε(x) is increasing in n. Given that SC is increasing in n
and ε(x), the result follows.  5
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose the voting rule is k-majority and pi(x) satisﬁes A.2. Moreover,
suppose, in equilibrium, jvj < ivi for some i,j ∈ N. Recall that k






pjji. Let kvk be the kth smallest continuation value in equilibrium (or,
equivalently, the kth cheapest vote) and also let wk be the payment such a player makes. In 9





= 1 − pi if ivi < kvk,
1 − pi if ivi = kvk,






wk + kvk − ivi if ivikvk,
wk if ivikvk. (A.5) 13
Now consider the following three cases. First, suppose jvj < ivi < kvk. From (A.4), this
implies i = 1 − pi and j = 1 − pj. Furthermore, since ivi < kvk and jvj < kvk, from 15
(A.5), we have wi = wk + kvk − ivi and wj = wk + kvk − jvj. Together these facts reveal
that k
i = k
j = 1 − wk − kvk. Second, suppose kvk < jvj < ivi. Once again, using (A.4) 17
and (A.5), this implies i = j = 0 and wi = wj = wk, which in turn imply k
i = k
j = −wk.
Finally,supposejvj kvkivi (withatleastoneinequalitybeingstrict).From(A.5),wehave 19
wi = wk and wj = wk + kvk − jvj. Furthermore, given i = 0 whenever kvk < ivi,w e
have k
i = 1 − wk −
i
1−pi ivi1 − wk −
i
1−pi kvk, and 21
k


























1−pj and hence k
i k
j. Overall, we have
shown that if, in equilibrium, jvj < ivi for some i,j ∈ N, then k
j k
i. 23
To prove the second part, suppose j i and cicj, and, in equilibrium, jvj = ivi for
some i,j ∈ N. By way of contradiction, assume k
i < k
j. Using a similar argument to the ﬁrst 25
part, it easily follows that k
j = k
i whenever jvj = ivi < kvk or kvk < jvj = ivi,
yielding a contradiction. Now, consider the case in which jvj = kvk = ivi. This means 27
wj = wi = wk, and given j i, vivj. Now, using the expression in (A.7) below, we also
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have vi = 1 − wk − (1 − pi)k
i and vj = 1 − wk − (1 − pj)k
j. Since vivj, we must have 1
(1−pi)k
i (1−pj)k
j. Furthermore, since k
i < k
j by hypothesis, we must also have pi < pj,
and hence xi <x j. This means xj > 0. Using the FOCs in (11), we obtain 3
εi




i cicj = εj





Sincef(x i)/xif(x j)/xj andεiεj,weha v e(1−pi)k
i (1−pj)k
j.Moreover,sincecicj 5
and εipi(1 − pi) =− (1 − pi) + 1 − pi by deﬁnition, we also have
[−(1 − pi) + 1 − pi]k
i cixi <c jxj =[ − (1 − pj) + 1 − pj]k
j 7
and hence (1 − pi)k
i <( 1 − pj)k
j, contradicting (1 − pi)k





Proof of Proposition 4. First, we characterize the equilibrium, and then show that there exists
one with a unique (x,v) pair. Inserting (11) into (10), 11
vi = pi(1 − wi) + (1 + εipi)iivi, or equivalently (A.6)
vi =1 − wi − (1 − pi)k
i. (A.7)
Let j i and cicj for some i,j ∈ N and suppose, by way of contradiction, that ivi < jvj
in equilibrium. We consider three relevant cases and generate a contradiction in each case. 13
Case 1: kvk < ivi < jvj. Then, from (A.4) and (A.5), wi = wj = wk and i = j = 0,
which yield k
i = k
j = 1 − wk. This implies xixj by Lemma A2, which, in turn, implies 15
pipj and vivj by (A.6). Given j i,w eh a v ejvj ivi, yielding a contradiction.
Case 2: ivi < jvj < kvk. From (A.4), we have i = 1 − pi and j = 1 − pj, revealing 17
that k
i = k
j = 1 − wk − kvk and hence xixj by Lemma A2. This implies pipj. From










implying jvj ivi—a contradiction. 21
Case 3: ivikvkjvj (at least one inequality being strict). Since ivi < jvj and j i,
we have vi <v j. Moreover, Lemma 2 implies k
i k
j. Now, I argue that xixj. Suppose not. 23
Then, xi >x j and hence pi > pj.G i v e nk
i k
j, this implies (1 − pi)k
i <( 1 − pj)k
j. From
(A.7), we must then have 25
vi + wi = 1 − (1 − pi)k
i > 1 − (1 − pj)k
j = vj + wj. (A.8)
Note that (A.5) reveals that wi = wk +kvk −ivi and wj = wk. Inserting these facts into (A.8) 27
and canceling terms reveal that vj < kvk + (1 − i)vi. Since kvkjvj, this further reveals
vj < jvj + (1 − i)vi, or equivalently (1 − j)vj <( 1 − i)vi.G i v e nj i and vi <v j by 29
hypothesis, this yields a contradiction. Hence, xixj.
This means pipj and εiεj. Note that xj > 0. Otherwise, we would have xj = xi = 0, 31
which would imply vi = vj = 0, and contradict ivi < jvj. Moreover, using the FOCs
in (11), and the exact arguments as in the last part of the proof of Lemma 2, it follows that 33
(1 − pi)k
i (1 − pj)k
j, where weak inequality follows because xixj.
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Once again, using (A.5), we observe wi = wk +kvk −ivi and wj = wk. Furthermore, from 1
(A.7), we have vi =
1−wk−kvk−(1−pi)k
i
1−i and vj = 1 − wk − (1 − pj)k
j, respectively. Using
these facts and ivikvk by hypothesis reveals 3




  ⇒ i[1 − wk − (1 − pi)k
i]kvk = k[1 − wk − (1 − pk)k
k]
  ⇒ (i − k)(1 − wk)i(1 − pi)k
i − k(1 − pk)k
k. (A.9)
Moreover, given kvkjvj,
k[1 − wk − (1 − pk)k
k]  j[1 − wk − (1 − pj)k
j]
  ⇒(k − j)(1 − wk)k(1 − pk)k
k − j(1 − pj)k
j.(A.10)
Summing (A.9) and (A.10), we obtain 5
(i − j)(1 − wk)<i(1 − pi)k
i − j(1 − pj)k
j,




(i − j)(1 − wk)<( i − j)(1 − pi)k
i
  ⇒1 − wk <( 1 − pi)k
i k
i 1 − wk,
a contradiction. 9
Overall, the three cases reveal that jvj ivi, proving the ﬁrst part. Lemma 2 further implies
k
j k
i. Using LemmaA2, the desired result in the second part follows. 11
Using this characterization, I now show there exists an SSP equilibrium with a unique (x,v)
pair. Since we have already shown the result for k = n and the result trivially follows for 13
k = 1, I restrict attention to cases where n3 and 1 <k<n . Without loss of generality, let
1 ···k ···n and c1 ···ck ···cn. In equilibrium, this implies 1v1 ··· 15
kvk ···nvn. Given this ordering, it is clear that each player i must belong to one of the
following four disjoint sets: For some j0 ∈{ 1,...,k} and j1 ∈{ k,...,n}, 17
L ={i ∈ N|1ij0 − 1 and ivi < kvk},
E ={i ∈ N|j0ik and ivi = kvk},
E ={i ∈ N|kij1 and ivi = kvk},
H ={i ∈ N|j1 + 1in and ivi > kvk}.
Suppose that E = E = . From (A.4) and (A.5), this implies that
i =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1 − wk − kvk ≡ L if i<k ,







kvk if i = k,
1 − wk ≡ H if i>k .
(A.11)
19
Let  i ≡ ci
i .Eq.(A.11)togetherwith(11)andLemmaA2revealthatthereexistsuniqueefforts
such that xi = x(  i,  −i). Since pi(x) is symmetric, so are x(  i,  −i) and pi = (  i,  −i). Note 21
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from (A.11) that, in equilibrium, ∗
k(H,L) solves G(k|H,L) = 0, where 1
G1(k|H,L) ≡ H − k −
k−1  
j=1
(  i,  −i)
n  
j =k
(  i,  −i)
(H − L).
Observe that G1(L|H,L)>0 and G1(H|H,L)<0. Thus, there is ∗
k(H,L) ∈ 3
[L,H] that solves G1(k|H,L) = 0. Moreover, somewhat complicated algebra reveals that
G 
1(∗
k(H,L)|H,L)<0, which implies the uniqueness of ∗
k(H,L). (Otherwise, if there 5
were another solution in [L,H], then G 
1(.)0 would hold.)
Next, using (A.7) and (A.5), and inserting in ∗
k(H,L), we note that, equilibrium, ∗
L(H) 7










pkH + (1 − pk)
k−1  
j=1
(  i,  −i)
n  
j =k










L(H) ∈[ 0,H]thatsolvesG2(L|H) =
0. Furthermore, G 
2(∗
L(H)|H)<0, which means ∗
L(H) is unique. Finally, inserting the fact 11











L(H). Since wk = 1 − H, the
equilibrium ∗
H solves G3(H) = 0, where 15







Note that G3(0) = 1 > 0 and G3(1)<0. Thus, there is ∗
H ∈ (0,1) that solves G3(H) = 0. 17
Furthermore, G 
3(∗
H)<0, implying that ∗
H is unique. Given that the pair (x,v) is uniquely
identiﬁed by i’s, it also exists and is unique. However, for this to be part of an equilibrium, the 19
conditions in L and H that we have assumed have to be satisﬁed, or simply it must be that
k−1vk−1 < kvk < k+1vk+1. If at least one of these conditions does not hold for speciﬁc i’s, 21
then it must be that the set H and/or E is nonempty. Suppose H =  and E  = . Once
again, deﬁne L and H as in (A.11). Since for i ∈ E, ivi = kvk,w eh a v evi = H−L
i by 23
(A.11). Furthermore, Eq. (A.7) implies that for i ∈{ k,...,j 1}, vi = 1 − wk − (1 − pi)i,o r




= H − (1 − pi)i for i ∈{ k,...,j 1}. (A.14)
Let(k(L,H),...,j1(L,H))bethesolutionto(A.14).Recallvk = H −(1−pk(L,H)) 27
k(L,H).Givenkvk = H−Lbydeﬁnition,theequilibrium∗
L(H)solvesG4(L|H) = 0,
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where G4(L|H) ≡[ (1−k)H +k(1−pk(L,H))k(L,H)]−L. Since G4(0|H)>0 1
and G4(H|H)<0, there is ∗
L(H) solves G4(L|H) = 0. Moreover, since G 
4(∗
L(H)|H)
< 0, it is unique. Finally, inserting ∗
L(H) and using the same manipulations, we see that the 3
equilibrium ∗






Using similar arguments as above, it is easy but tedious to show that there is a unique ∗
H ∈[ 0,1], 5
which in turn uniquely determines the pair (x,v). For this to be part of an equilibrium, it must
be that k−1vk−1 < kvk = ··· = j1vj1 < j1+1vj1+1. If this condition is not satisﬁed, then 7
we similarly exhaust the remaining possibilities for which we ﬁnd a unique pair of (x,v). The
existence of an equilibrium follows by construction.  9
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that ci = c and i =  for all i ∈ N, and that pi(x) satisﬁes
A.2. From Proposition 4, the equilibrium pair of (x,v) is unique and symmetric. Inserting the 11
facts xi = x, pi = 1
n, r
i = 1 − rnv, and v = 1





n − rε(x)(n − 1)
, 13
x =
ε(x)(n − 1)(1 − r)
cn[n − rε(x)(n − 1)]
. (A.15)
Suppose that x weakly increases in r. This implies ε(x) weakly decreases in r, and given that 15
ther.h.s.of(A.15)increasesinε(x)anddecreasesinr,sodoesther.h.s.of(A.15),acontradiction.
Hence, x decreases in r. Similar arguments also reveal that x decreases in . Since v = 1
n − cx, 17
these imply that v increases in r and .
To show that the total equilibrium cost, i.e., ncx increases in n, suppose not. Then, x must be 19
decreasing in n, which means ε(x) is increasing in n. Since ncx = ε(x)(n−1)(1−r)
n−rε(x)(n−1) , and the r.h.s.
is increasing in n and ε(x), the r.h.s. must be decreasing in n. This contradicts the l.h.s. Hence, 21
ncx increases in n. Recall that v = 1
n − cx = 1−ncx
n , which means v decreases in n. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Recalling that  ≡ sp − snp = 1 − rnv, and that, from the proof of 23
Proposition 5, nv is decreasing in n, the desired result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose that i =  and ci = c for all i and that pi(x) and qi(x) satisfy 25
A.2 andA.3 with 


































i − c0 (= 0i fxi > 0), (A.17)
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i ≡ 1−wi −
i
1−pi ivi as in the text.As in the proof of Proposition 4, I ﬁrst characterize 1
the equilibrium. Suppose i > j but, on the contrary, vi <v j for some i,j ∈ N.
Case1:vk <v i <v j.Then,li = mj = 0forl  = i andm  = j,whichimplieswi = wj = wk 3
and k
i = k
j = 1 − wk. From (A.17), we have xi = xj and pi = pj. Inserting these facts into
(A.16) reveals vivj, a contradiction. 5
Case2:vi <v j <v k.Then,li = mj = 1andhencei = 1−pi andj = 1−pj,revealing
that k
i = k
j = 1−wk −vk.Again, from (A.17), we have xi = xj and pi = pj. Inserting these 7
facts into (A.16) reveals vivj, a contradiction.





j, LemmaA2 reveals that xixj.This means pipj and εiεj. Note that
xj > 0. Otherwise, we would have xj = xi = 0, which would imply vivj, and contradict vi < 11
vj. Moreover, using the FOCs in (11), we obtain
εi




i c = εj






Sincef(x i)/xif(x j)/xj andεiεj,wehave(1−pi)k
i (1−pj)k
j.Moreover,sinceεipi(1−
pi) =− (1 − pi) + 1 − pi by deﬁnition, we also have 15
[−(1 − pi) + 1 − pi]k
i cxicxj =[ − (1 − pj) + 1 − pj]k
j
and hence (1 − pi)k
i (1 − pj)k
j. 17
Next we combine (A.16) and (A.17), to obtain a similar expression to Eq. (A.7):
vi = 1 − wi − Ri, (A.18) 19
where Ri ≡ 
(1 − i)  k
i + (1 − 
)(1 − pi)k
i,  k
i ≡ 1 − wi −
  i




Eq. (A.5) reveals that wi = wk +vk −vi and wj = wk. Furthermore, from (A.18), we have 21
vi = 1−wk−vk−Ri
1− and vj = 1 − wk − Rj, respectively. Since vivk by hypothesis, it follows:
1 − wk − vk − Ri
1 − 
 vk
  ⇒1 − wk − Rivk. (A.19)
Moreover, given vkvj,( A.19) implies 1−wk −Ri < 1−wk −Rj, where the strict inequality 23
is due to the hypothesis of Case 3. From here, we have Rj <R i, or equivalently

(1 − j)  k
j + (1 − 
)(1 − pj)k
j < 
(1 − i)  k
i + (1 − 
)(1 − pi)k
i. 25
Since (1 − pi)k
i (1 − pj)k
j, it must be that (1 − j)  k
j <( 1 − i)  k
i. Moreover, using the
deﬁnitions of  k
i and  k
j, and recalling i > j, it follows that  i <  j. However, since vi <v j, 27
we have  i  j, a contradiction.
Overall, these three cases reveal that vivj, which, given vivj and Lemma 2, implies 29
k
i k
j. From (A.17), this further implies xixj. The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
pair (x,v) can be established by using similar arguments in Proposition 4.  31
Please cite this article as: HuseyinYildirim, Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly
recognition, Journal of Economic Theory (2006), doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.008UNCORRECTED PROOF
YJETH3449
ARTICLE IN PRESS
H.Yildirim / Journal of Economic Theory ( ) – 29
Acknowledgments 1
I thank two anonymous referees and the associate editor for very useful comments and sug-
gestions. I also thank Jeremy Burke, Florin Dorobantu, Hulya Eraslan, Wolfgang Kohler, Tracy
Lewis, Curtis Taylor, and seminar participants at Bilkent University, Boston College, the 2005
Midwest Theory Conference, the 2005 Public Choice Meetings, and the 2006 Summer Meetings
of Econometric Society for helpful comments and discussions. Paul Dudenhefer provided valu-
able editorial help. Part of this research was undertaken when I visited the Kellogg School of
Management. I am grateful for its hospitality.All remaining errors are mine.
References
[1] D. Baron, J. Ferejohn, Bargaining and agenda control formation in legislatures, Amer. Econ. Rev. 77 (1987) 303– 3
309 (Papers and Proceedings).
[2] D. Baron, J. Ferejohn, Bargaining in legislatures,Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 83 (1989) 1181–1206. 5
[3] D. Baron, J. Ferejohn, The power to propose, in: P.C. Ordeshook (Ed.), Models of Strategic Choice in Politics,
University of Michigan Press,AnnArbor, 1989, pp. 343–366. 7
[4] D. Baron, E. Kalai, The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game, J. Econ. Theory 61 (1993) 290–301.
[5] K. Binmore, Perfect equilibria in bargaining models, in: K. Binmore, P. Dasgupta (Eds.), The Economics of 9
Bargaining, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987, pp. 77–105.
[6] F. Bloch, Sequential formation of coalitions with ﬁxed payoff division, Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996) 90–123. 11
[7] F. Bloch, S.S. Pages, R. Soubeyran, When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent-
seeking contests and policy conﬂicts, Econ. Governance, forthcoming. 13
[8] K. Chatterjee, B. Dutta, D. Ray, K. Sengupta, A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining, Rev. Econ. Stud.
60 (1993) 463–477. 15
[9] Y.K. Che, I. Gale, Caps on political lobbying,Amer. Econ. Rev. 88 (1998) 643–651.
[10] H. Eraslan, Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron–Ferejohn model, J. Econ. Theory 103 (2002) 17
11–30.
[11] H. Eraslan,A. Merlo, Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining, J. Econ. Theory 103 (2002) 31–48. 19
[12] J. Esteban, D. Ray, Conﬂict and distribution, J. Econ. Theory 87 (1999) 379–415.
[13] R. Evans, R., Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers, Games Econ. Behav. 19 (1997) 211–220. 21
[14] G.W. Fairholm, Organizational Power Politics: Tactics in Organizational Leadership, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1993.
[15] F. Gul, Bargaining foundations of the Shapley value, Econometrica 57 (1989) 81–95. 23
[16] J.Harrington,Thepoweroftheproposalmakerinamodelofendogenousagendaformation,PublicChoice94(1990)
1–20. 25
[17] M. Herrero,A strategic bargaining approach to market institutions, Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1985.
[18] R. Inderst, H. Muller, K. Warneryd, Distributional conﬂict in organizations, Europ. Econ. Rev., forthcoming. 27
[19] B. Knight, Estimating the value of proposal power,Amer. Econ. Rev., forthcoming.
[20] W. Leininger, More efﬁcient rent-seeking—a Munchhausen solution, Public Choice 75 (1993) 43–62. 29
[21] E. Maskin, Bargaining, coalitions, and externalities, Working Paper, Princeton University, 2003.
[22] A. Merlo, C. Wilson, A stochastic model of sequential bargaining with complete information, Econometrica 63 31
(1995) 371–399.
[23] A. Merlo, C. Wilson, Efﬁcient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining, Econ. Theory 11 (1998) 39–55. 33
[24] H. Muller, K. Warneryd, Inside versus outside ownership: a political theory of ﬁrm, RAND J. Econ. 32 (2001)
527–541. 35
[25] S. Nitzan, Modeling rent-seeking contests, Europ. J. Polit. Economy 10 (1994) 41–60.
[26] K.O. Nti, Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations, Public Choice 98 (1999) 415–430. 37
[27] A. Okada, A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers, Games Econ. Behav. 16 (1996)
97–108. 39
[28] D.Perez-Castrillo,D.Wettstein,Choosingwisely:amultibiddingapproach,Amer.Econ.Rev.92(2002)1577–1587.
[29] D. Perez-Castrillo, D. Wettstein,An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments, J. Econ. Theory 127 (2006) 41
296–308.
[30] J. Pfeffer, Power in Organizations, Pittman, Marshﬁeld, MA, 1981. 43
[31] D. Ray, R. Vohra, Equilibrium binding agreements, J. Econ. Theory 73 (1997) 30–78.
Please cite this article as: HuseyinYildirim, Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly
recognition, Journal of Economic Theory (2006), doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.008UNCORRECTED PROOF
30 H.Yildirim / Journal of Economic Theory ( ) –
YJETH3449
ARTICLE IN PRESS
[32] D. Ray, R. Vohra,A theory of endogenous coalition structures, Games Econ. Behav. 26 (1999) 286–336. 1
[33] A. Rubinstein, Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model, Econometrica 50 (1982) 97–109.
[34] S. Skaperdas, Cooperation, conﬂict, and power in the absence of property rights, Amer. Econ. Rev. 82 (1992) 3
720–739.
[35] S. Skaperdas, Contest success functions, Econ. Theory 7 (1996) 283–290. 5
[36] J. Sutton, Noncooperative bargaining theory: an introduction, Rev. Econ. Stud. 53 (1986) 245–262.
[37] F. Szidarovski, K. Okuguchi, On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games, 7
Games Econ. Behav. 18 (1997) 135–140.
[38] E. Winter, Incentives and discrimination,Amer. Econ. Rev. 94 (2004) 764–773. 9
Please cite this article as: HuseyinYildirim, Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly
recognition, Journal of Economic Theory (2006), doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.008